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INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

SONODA ON KOREAN ISSUE--United Nations, Sept. 25 (HAPTONG)--Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda today expressed the hope that a substantive dialogue between South and North Korea will be resumed as promptly as possible. In his keynote address to the 34th U.N. General Assembly, the Japanese foreign minister said, "We, on our part, will continue to cooperate with all countries concerned to foster an international climate that is conducive to the relaxation of tensions on the peninsula." Mr. Sonoda said, "At present, the dialogue between South and North Korea is suspended, the tripartite talks proposed jointly to North Korea by President Pak Chong-hui of the Republic of Korea and President Carter of the United States, have not yet come about. Since the building of genuine peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is a matter of deep concern to Japan, we hope that a substantive dialogue between South and North Korea will be resumed as promptly as possible." [Text] [Seoul HAPTONG in English 0132 GMT 26 Sep 79 SK]

CSO: 4120

S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

ROK DRP REAFFIRMS PLAN TO 'CENSURE' KIM YONG-SAM

Seoul HAPTONG in English 0310 GMT 29 Sep 79 SK

[Text] Seoul, 29 Sep (HAPTONG)--Leaders of the ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) today reaffirmed their plan to censure opposition leader Rep. Kim Yong-sam during the current national assembly session for his controversial remarks in a recent interview with the NEW YORK TIMES.

DRP officials said that the ruling camp leaders holding a party caucus this morning decided to discipline Kim with "appropriate measures" by pushing a motion through the national assembly when the house reopens its session on 4 October.

The governing party and its sister floor group Yujong-hoe submitted disciplinary motion against Kim to the national assembly last Saturday following Kim's reported call in the interview for a U.S. intervention with the Seoul government for improvement in political situation in Korea.

The head of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) has since been under fire from both the government and the ruling camp which branded his remarks as reckless and intolerable.

"The interview and other statements Rep. Kim recently made has now clearly showed that he was bent on seeking a change of political power by illegal means," a DEP official told reporters after the party caucus.

Meanwhile, acting DRP chairman Pak Chun-kyu denounced Rep. Kim for attempting continuously to stir up social confusion and create political instability.

Speaking at a rally marking the reorganization of the ruling party's Seoul district chapter, Rep. Pak stressed that what was most important for the nation at this juncture was to maintain a national consensus.

He called Rep. Kim's interview remark an abominable crime committed against the state which should be condemned in the name of the people.

S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

KOREA WATCHERS CITE REASONS WHY KIM TAE-CHUNG IS UNDER HOUSE ARREST

Tokyo KYODO in English no time given 13 Sep 79 OW

[Text] Seoul 13 Sep KYODO--South Korean authorities Wednesday forbade opposition leader Kim Tae-chung to meet foreign correspondents here and South Korean national assemblymen.

Kim, former opposition presidential candidate, has been under house arrest for more than 3 months.

The authorities allow his wife to go to the marketplace for everyday shopping and his 16-year-old son to go to high school. But they banned his family's other outside contacts.

The authorities' action came 1 day after Kim met with Kim Yong-sam, a leader of the opposition New Democratic Party, and confirmed their joint efforts for expanding the unity of opposition political forces.

An authoritative source said the action is a temporary one taken by the police chief concerned, in accordance with the domestic law regarding persons whose prison terms were suspended in a general amnesty. How long it will last has not yet been decided, the source said.

The source indicated that the action against Kim Tae-chung was taken for fear of his instigating a rebellion or riot.

Some watchers believe that the law-enforcement authorities took the step to prevent Kim from furthering the influence on the growing anti-government group in recent weeks as well as to avoid another imprisonment of Kim.

Wednesday night, Kim Tae-chung said over the telephone that the authorities also ordered his other two sons, living in other houses, not to visit his home. He expressed strong indignation at this step, terming it an illegal action.

After Kim was released from custody last December in a general pardon, he was taken by police for questioning on a few occasions, regarding his anti-government speeches.

However, before the opposition New Democratic Party held its convention on May 30, Kim was allowed to go out of his home sometimes.

But after Kim Yong-sam was elected the NDP chairman at the meeting, with Kim Tae-chung's support, had the authorities put Kim Tae-chung under virtual house arrest again on May 31.

The watchers believe that under the latest condition, it would be virtually impossible for Kim to receive foreign politicians and diplomats at his home.

CSO: 4120

S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

ROK OPPOSITION CONSIDERS BOYCOTT OR MASS RESIGNATION

Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 3 Oct 79 p 1 SK

[Text] The opposition New Democratic Party decided yesterday to take strong countermeasures against the ruling camp's move to expel its President Rep. Kim Yong-sam from the parliament with a decision to deal with a motion for disciplinary action against him during the current regular national assembly session.

The party is reportedly studying such actions as a full boycott of the present house sitting and an en masse resignation from parliamentary membership as counter-plans against the motion forwarded by the majority side 22 September to take issue with Rep. Kim's controversial remarks in recent days.

Announcing the convocation of a general caucus of its lawmakers today, party floor leader Rep. Hwang Nak-chu revealed that the Opposition Party would cope with the ruling bloc's policy to punish Rep. Kim with a "serious resolution" of all party lawmakers.

The emergency meeting will discuss how to meet the ruling camp's strong intention to discipline Rep. Kim heavily and what to do after the NDP leader is punished.

He said that the party planned to enforce a four-phase method of struggle to counter the ruling party, and it would use every means available to obstruct what he called the "unlawful punishment" of Rep. Kim.

Rep. Kim also stressed that he was determined to march on fairly, even if he was arrested.

Making it clear that he was reluctant to make either an explanation or an apology about and for his remarks, he said that he would tackle firmly the ruling camp's attempt to oust him from the parliament.

Rep. Hwang claimed, "the motion submitted to the national assembly by the majority side against Rep. Kim on the ground he made remarks to destroy constitutional order is political revenge against a man who is struggling aggressively for democracy."

"We cannot help concluding that the motion is against all opposition party lawmakers unified around Rep. Kim and furthermore against all the people who support Rep. Kim," he insisted.

He pointed out that the national assembly had not disciplined the president of the opposition party, taking issue with his remarks made outside the parliament, in its history of three decades.

"Such an action by the ruling parties came from their self-righteous intention to make the opposition party's view of the present situation the same as their own," the floor leader argued.

"We make it clear that the ruling camp should bear all responsibilities, if the punishment of Rep. Kim gives rise to a political upheaval and the people's protest," he said.

The NDP floor leader had a meeting with key party officials such as Secretary General Rep. Pak Han-sang and disciplinary committee chairman Rep. Choe Hyong-u to discuss the issue.

The staff officials of the party shared the view that there could be neither mainstreamers nor non-mainstreamers in launching a strong struggle against the ruling camp-forwarded motion, according to him.

CSO: 4120

S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

ROK, RULING PARTY TO 'MODIFY' LABOR LAWS

Seoul HAPTONG in English 0100 GMT 27 Sep 79 SK

[Text] Seoul, Sept. 27 (HAPTONG)--The government and the ruling party will modify the labor related laws in a move to ensure a freer labor movement and to prevent outside forces from interfering in labor affairs.

The move agreed upon in a meeting of Democratic Republican party leaders and administration officials Wednesday followed a sit-in by a group of women textile workers against layoffs at the headquarters of an opposition party last month and the subsequent allegation that the sit-in was organized at the instigation of an outside element. A government investigation at the time disclosed an extensive involvement of the urban industrial mission in the nation's labor organizations.

The meeting, however, decided against repealing the special measures law on national defense and security barring the labor collective action, one of the major demands made by the political opposition. The opposition New Democratic Party has long claimed the special legislation is a major factor impeding a free labor movement.

Since the special legislation recognizes the labors bargaining right, the conferees agreed to provide a provision designed to reinforce the bargaining right in an enforcement decree to the labor related laws while leaving the special measure intact, according to a conference source.

The meeting was also known to have recognized the necessity of revising the pertinent legal provisions in order to accord priority to wage claims by laid-off workers. This is intended to ensure the livelihood of workers who lose their job through the closure of their employment places and for other reasons.

An amendment bill to this effect will be presented to the current regular house session to be resumed next month.

CSO: 4120

S. KOREA/ POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

BRIEFS

NDP OFFICIALS ARRESTED--Seoul, Sept. 18 (HAPTONG)--Two staff members of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) were put under arrest by police Monday for violating the law on assembly and demonstration. According to the police, Yi Su-nam, director of the Youth Bureau of the NDP, and Pae Chong-yuk, deputy chief of the training bureau, were suspected of having gathered some party members outside the party headquarters building here on Sept. 10 to denounce the recent court injunction against party president Kim Yong-sam. They termed it a political "fabrication." Meanwhile, two other staff members of the opposition party are now on a wanted list on the same charge. [Text] [Seoul HAPTONG in English 0054 GMT 18 Sep 79 SK]

CSO: 4120

S. KOREA/MILITARY AFFAIRS

PROS, CONS OF ROK NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT ANALYZED

Seoul SIN TONGA in Korean May 79 pp 324-335

[Article by Yo Yong-mu, Investigative Bureau chief of TONGA ILBO: "Should the ROK Develop Nuclear Weapons?"]

[Text] If the ROK is to pursue nuclear development, there are a number of problems to be taken into consideration, including relations with the United States, heavy military expenditures and technology. However, from the standpoint of security, even more important than nuclear weapons is the desire of the people to defend their country.

Introduction

With the coming of the 1970's, pluralization of the previous international order of bipolarization between the United States and the Soviet Union began to take place, and with the transfer from the super powers of responsibility for security to the individual nations themselves, the "problem of self-existence" took on greater significance. Such acceptance of responsibility for one's own existence brings one face to face with the stark reality of "whatever the means employed, one must find the solution by oneself." In stating "whatever the means employed," it is understood that if it is not with conventional weapons, then one "must be armed with nuclear weapons."

Following this vein, we note that the trend is for an enemy nation, which threatens one's existence, and neighboring nations to vie with one another in emphasizing the development of nuclear power and in desiring the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. The ROK too, which is pitted politically and militarily against the North Korean communists to the north of a 155-mile demilitarized zone, continues to be threatened by communist designs and is forced to mobilize every means possible to safeguard its existence.

Consequently, in order to test foreign reaction to a nuclear weapons development program, the ROK set up research facilities. In a 26 June 1975 interview with the WASHINGTON POST, President Pak Chong-hui stated that, "in the event the United States withdraws its nuclear umbrella, our nation will do whatever is necessary to guarantee its existence, including the development of nuclear weapons."

Israel, under the threat of the Arab bloc, has already made it known that it is arming itself with nuclear weapons. In response to the nuclear armament of the PRC, India conducted a test nuclear explosion in 1974, and as a result of Indian nuclear tests and the resulting threat, Pakistan is aspiring to nuclear armament.

The model of international relations is a phenomenon which can be seen everywhere throughout the world. If things continue as they are, by the year 2000 it is possible that some 10-20 nations will be armed with nuclear weapons. As the number of nations armed with nuclear weapons increases, it is not at all unlikely that the potential for using nuclear weapons to solve disputes between countries will also increase. Harvard University professor Thomas C. Schilling has mused that we will be extremely lucky if we have avoided nuclear war by 1999.

The potential for a given country to develop nuclear weaponry is gradually increasing. Although the number of nations possessing a nuclear capability was limited to five during the decade after 1964, India's nuclear test explosion in May 1974 influenced the rest of the world greatly, both politically and psychologically, and disturbed her immediate neighbors. India was the first to become a nuclear country since the PRC joined the nuclear club (1964) and since the promulgation of the 1970 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and was the sixth nuclear power. India emphasized that this nuclear explosion was a "peaceful nuclear explosion," but there was no guarantee that the capability derived from the test explosion would not be used for military objectives. Thus India attracted attention as the first model country which had carried out a nuclear explosion with the plutonium obtained from a civil nuclear program. Although India was not a signatory to the NPT, her actions demonstrated the flimsiness of the treaty.

Following the 1973 energy crisis and the subsequent four-fold increase in the price of crude oil, the demand for nuclear energy as an alternate energy increased sharply. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has reported that, by the year 1980, 100,000 kg of plutonium will have been produced in nuclear reactors, and that if this quantity is combined with the amount produced up until the present, it will total 350,000 kg of plutonium. India needed only 5 kg of plutonium to conduct its test nuclear explosion; this 5 kg is equivalent to the two bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Further accelerating nuclear proliferation is technological innovation. Heavy water reactors produce nuclear fuel from natural uranium, and reactors which consume less fuel are under development in France, West Germany, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, the result being that the technical problems associated with development of nuclear weapons are being overcome day by day. In addition, the necessity for the United States to continue its interventionist foreign policy is being questioned in light of the development of the containment and detente of bipolarization, the retrenchment of American military strength subsequent to the Nixon Doctrine and the Vietnam War, the

trend toward dispersal of the strength of the super powers and friendship between Japan, the PRC and the United States. As a result, much greater emphasis is being given to regional balances of power than to a global balance of power. In the economic sphere as well, Third World nations are demanding a new economic order and are pursuing an independent line.

As can be seen from the points enumerated above, individual countries are demanding greater increases in their own military strength, and in addition are focusing their concern on nuclear armament. In addition to the necessity for self-defense in a time of pluralism when nations are actively seeking increased military strength through the inclusion of nuclear armaments, key issues which can be enumerated include improvements in the dignity and status of individual nations, as well as consolidation of domestic political power.

As for opposition to non-nuclear nations outside the five major nuclear powers becoming newly armed with nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear nations assert that only those nations with existing nuclear capabilities wish to maintain the exclusionary nuclear club, and that their actions are designed to rationalize this intent. Consequently, the assertion that developing nations are less responsible and less reliable when it comes to nuclear weapons than the existing nuclear nations is criticized as being presumptuous. The non-nuclear nations believe that the existing nuclear powers wish to perpetuate unequal possession of nuclear power. French Gen Pierre Gallois holds the radical opinion that a world composed of numerous nuclear powers would, as a system of deterrence through the threat of retaliation, be more peaceful and more stable. However, notwithstanding the grounds for the foregoing argument, a world in which there is a continuous increase in the number of nuclear nations will become that much more unstable and there will be that much more destruction of security. The reason is as follows. As the number of nations armed with nuclear weapons increases, the possibility of nuclear war as a result of accident or miscalculation becomes greater, and the potential also increases for an enemy to launch a preemptive strike once it has built up its nuclear military strength. In addition, the potential is laid for the possibility of being dragged into a nuclear war on behalf of an ally, for the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, for their use in the event of national threat or political fabrication or civil war, as well as for their use during a regional arms race or dispute; it is even possible that there may appear an unstable or inhumane leader who would in fact make use of nuclear weapons.

Under such conditions, crisis management and disputes become tremendously more complex and difficult.

Motives for Nuclear Weapons Development

General Motives

There are various motives behind a nation's intent to possess nuclear weapons. However, what may constitute a desirable motive for one nation may act as an unfavorable motive for another. A national which has decided to acquire

nuclear weapons, which are still expensive and entail technological difficulties, may be able to do so through a motive based on a unique set of circumstances, but in general, opting for nuclear weapons is based on the following motives.

A threat to a nation appears in a variety of forms. With the dispersal of power, many nations feel threatened by neighboring countries. If these neighboring nations possess nuclear arms or are believed to be desirous of obtaining such weapons, the motive is further strengthened. When India set off its nuclear explosion, a Pakistani spokesman immediately indicated that his country would obtain a nuclear capability. Despite the signing of the peace treaty on 27 March 1979, relations between Egypt and Israel are exactly the same. Nations such as South Africa and Israel feel isolated politically because of geographical factors, and perceive that their long-term security is deteriorating. Since nuclear weapons serve to offset such deterioration of security and are considered the ultimate means of guaranteeing the continued existence of such nations, the environment of these nations provides a powerful motive for becoming armed with nuclear weapons.

The desire to possess nuclear arms does not, of course, stem only from this. There is also the incentive associated with the advantages of range and efficiency that nuclear weapons have over conventional arms. Since a small nation which possesses nuclear arms is capable of effectively turning aside encroachment by a powerful nation, such weapons are viewed as equalizers.

Until recently, the only guarantee against the nuclear threat for most non-nuclear nations was to obtain a commitment of support from a major power, but now such commitments are eroding and their reliability wearing thin. Nowadays, as a substitute for the big power guarantee of security, non-nuclear nations are being forced to take on development and production of nuclear weapons.

In the event the United States retreats into neo-isolationism, nuclear proliferation will rapidly spread.

It used to be that nations exerted great effort to improve their power and prestige on the international stage. Subsequent to 1945, nuclear weapons were perceived as the means for manifesting power and influence. In addition, nuclear weapons became the symbol of isolation and autonomy. Those nations in possession of such weapons were quite aware of the importance of nuclear arms as a military tool and, of course, as a political tool. It was not by chance that the nations composing the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are all nuclear nations. It is no wonder then that leaders of countries which wished to enhance their international influence were strongly attracted to the acquisition of nuclear arms.

Related to improvement in a nation's power and prestige is the improvement of a nation's equality and position. Nuclear weapons, like the computer, have become a symbol of a nation's modernization and technological capability. There is continually increasing pressure for non-nuclear nations to embark upon the development of nuclear weapons close upon the heels of economic

development. The goal of the underdeveloped nation is to bring an end to the separation of those who have nuclear arms from those who do not. The classification of nuclear and non-nuclear nations is becoming the norm for this separation. As for the Nonproliferation Treaty, the objective of the big powers is being interpreted as that of permanently relegating non-nuclear nations to a second class status. Consequently, nuclear proliferation is considered an effort to facilitate equality between nuclear and non-nuclear nations through the redistribution of power on the international level.

The decision to develop nuclear weapons involves, to a considerable extent, a domestic political function. National leaders are attracted to the option to develop nuclear weapons as a means of taking the populace's mind off the economy, restoring confidence in the state and increasing popular support for the government. It is a widely held belief that India's "peaceful nuclear test explosion" resulted largely from political considerations. In other words, the test was designed to display popular support for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

In a national debate over the pros and cons of possessing nuclear weapons, a great deal depends upon the personality of leading statesmen. In one country, the issue may be settled by public opinion, while in another country, the outcome will depend on the level of power of a faction. Similarly, a decision may be formed within the collective body of bureaucrats--the military, political and scientific elites. However, the exorbitant political costs that are paid when a nation gains a nuclear capability cannot be ignored.

A newly acquired nuclear capability of one country will stimulate the acquisition of such a capability by neighboring nations and potential enemies, which will in turn result unavoidably in the increased cost of counteracting such a chain reaction.

At this point in time there are nine nations in the world which have either recently arrived on the scene as a nuclear nation or have a latent nuclear capability, including Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and South Africa. Of these, only the ROK, Taiwan and Iran are bound by the NPT.

Motives for Development by the ROK

In addition to the general motives for development of nuclear weapons outlined above, the following facts can be cited in regard to the ROK. To wit, taking into consideration the communization of the Indochinese Peninsula in the spring of 1975, the announcement by the Carter administration in March of 1977 of its unilateral decision to withdraw all U.S. ground forces stationed in Korea, the retrenchment of U.S. military strength in the South Pacific, and continued provocations by the North Korean communist regime (the axe incident at Panmunjon on 18 August 1976, the shooting down of an American helicopter on 14 July 1977 and so on), the ROK has had no choice but to consider opting for the development of nuclear weapons to guarantee its continued existence.

As pointed out earlier, President Pak previewed the possibility of nuclear weapons development for the sake of self-preservation in his 26 June 1975 interview with the WASHINGTON POST; on 29 June 1977, Foreign Minister Pak Tong-chin was quoted as stating, "Although we do not intend to develop nuclear arms, I think that we are capable, as a sovereign state, of determining on our own what is necessary for national security and protection of our people, not only as concerns the nuclear question, but in other problems as well." Minister Pak also noted that "despite the conclusion of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, we have the right to take whatever steps are appropriate, irregardless of the conclusion of international treaties or agreements, when special circumstances arise which make it impossible to adhere to them."

When such statements on the part of the Korean government are taken into consideration, they can be taken as a strong indication that the ROK will go to the extent of development of nuclear weapons if it perceives that its existence is being threatened.

The anti-ROK posture of the North Korean communists provides a strong push to the incentive for, and desirability of, the option for development of nuclear weapons by the ROK. Their current socialist constitution clearly delineates the ultimate objective of the North Korean communists as the communization of the ROK: "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has achieved the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of the peninsula, and will peacefully unify the fatherland on a democratic basis involving the entire nation, and without outside interference."

Their posturing in regard to the fulfillment of this objective began in 1972 and then was curtailed in 1972, and has not softened in the slightest following reopening of the North-South talks on 17 February 1979. Military expenditures for the four-point military policy--arming the entire populace, professionalization and modernization of the entire military, and fortification of the land--have been continuously increased. The 22 January 1979 issue of NEWSWEEK reported that the ROK had discovered three tunnels dug by the North Koreans extending to a maximum of 60 meters south of the demilitarized zone, and that recently North Korean tunneling operations had been detected in the DMZ. Furthermore, the WASHINGTON POST on 14 January reported that the U.S. Army and the American CIA had determined that the number of group troops in North Korea, with a population of no more than 17 million, is 560,000-600,000 men--considerably more than originally believed, and that, in terms of numbers, now ranks fifth in the world after the PRC, the Soviet Union, India and the United States.

Several Problems Related to Development of Nuclear Arms

The Technological Problem

In order to undertake an examination of the problems of technology and treaties, it is necessary to understand the level of capability of the ROK for nuclear development. The reason for this is that this measurement of

capability serves as a yardstick for determining whether or not a country will be capable of developing nuclear weapons. At this juncture, let's take a look at the two basic elements--the nuclear fuel cycle facility and its military application.

There are several types of nuclear fuel cycle models, depending on the type of reactor, but for our purposes here we will regard two representative types, the light water reactor and the heavy water reactor, as the standard. There are substantial natural uranium deposits in both North and South Korea. According to a Nuclear Energy Research Institute (KERI) report, U-380 deposits total some 3,400 tons in the ROK.

The Korean Nuclear Development Commission, established by the ROK government in 1976, completed a pilot plant for processing nuclear fuel in 1978, and in mid-1980 will begin work on a plant which will produce 300 tons of uranium fuel per year. In addition, the ROK has long-range plans to construct a plant capable of refining 300 tons of uranium per year and converting it to fuel. There is no possibility that either South Korea or North Korea will develop enrichment facilities using the gas diffusion method or centrifuge method in the near future. The reasons for this include the astronomical cost of construction and the lack of high technology.

In the absence of enriched uranium facilities, a system using a heavy water reactor, which uses natural uranium as a fuel, can be employed. There are plans for the ROK to construct a CANDU-type reactor (pressurized heavy water reactor) by 1982. The ROK began development of its latest nuclear reactor in 1978. The government plans to build five nuclear power plants by 1986, and a total of 44 nuclear plants by the year 2000. The emphasis of these, of course, is for energy independence rather than the direct manufacture of nuclear arms.

In addition, the ROK has two research reactors which are intended for research on the production of radioactive isotopes. North Korea was supplied with a research reactor by the Soviet Union in 1965. North Korea has also wanted to construct a nuclear power plant with Soviet assistance, but reportedly has not yet been able to do so.

From the standpoint of military applications, the most important element is that of reprocessing. In 1976 the ROK initiated plans to purchase an experimental plutonium reprocessing plant from France, but then canceled them. Pressure from the United States was the reason for this. At that time the United States threatened that, if the ROK did not cancel its plans, it would withhold a \$292 million U.S. Import-Export Bank loan earmarked for construction of the Kori #2 unit. As of now, the ROK government has no plans to establish a plutonium reprocessing plant.

Next, if one is to understand what is involved in a nuclear weapons development capability, one must take into consideration the three basic elements of fissionable materials, fabrication of nuclear arms and delivery systems. There are difficulties inherent in the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons, but the fundamental level of technological difficulty lies in obtaining an adequate quantity and quality of nuclear fissionable materials. Three types of fissionable materials, Plutonium 239 (PU-239), Uranium 235 (U-235) and Uranium 233 (U-233), are obtainable in both South and North Korea, but U-233 and U-235 entail the need for high technology and enormous production costs and will not be obtainable in the near future. Consequently, any intent to manufacture nuclear weapons will be limited to the production of PU-239, which itself will require 10 years. Although North Korea possesses a somewhat limited research nuclear reactor, they would need 6 to 10 years to be able to construct even a small nuclear power plant.

The potential of the ROK to produce nuclear weapons will be realized between 1978 and 1987, and if the intent is in fact to manufacture such weapons, some step must be taken toward refining plutonium--i.e. bringing into operation a nuclear reactor capable of producing the fissionable plutonium used in the fabrication of nuclear weapons. It is not possible to expect a potential for nuclear weapons production without a reprocessing technology. Construction of a reprocessing plant adds a great deal of time and expense to the scope of industrialization. For a highly industrialized country, the cost of constructing a reprocessing plant capable of producing 15-20 kg of PU-239 (enough for 2 or 3 bombs) per year is 2 or 3 million dollars.

In 1976 the ROK Nuclear Energy Research Institute drafted a \$4 million plan to construct a first-stage nuclear fuel processing facility and a chemical reprocessing facility for test purposes. Once a nation has the ability to manufacture nuclear fissionable materials, it is a matter of course for nuclear weapons to fall into its hands. Nuclear weapons technology of course requires the development of theoretical and facilities planning, fabrication, outdoor testing of bombs and so on, as well as specialists who are thoroughly knowledgeable in the basic information of the field.

Another key element is whether or not a nation can adequately develop a skilled and technically well-trained work force. According to a UN report, a plan to develop a typical nuclear weapon will require approximately 1,300 engineers and some 5,000 scientists. Acquisition of such a work force is immediately attainable in the case of both the ROK and North Korea.

Let us next look at the means for delivering the completed nuclear weapon. According to a Hudson Research Institute report, there are six methods available to nations with a nuclear capability to deliver (attack with) a nuclear weapon, including 1) surprise attack, 2) aircraft capable of carrying a nuclear bomb, 3) unguided rocket, 4) Christmas Day, 5) naval attack and 6) ballistic missile. The ROK successfully test fired a medium-long range ground-to-ground missile, which was indigenously developed, in September 1978.

Should the ROK decide to arm itself with nuclear weapons, it would be able to utilize an indigenously produced missile as the method of nuclear delivery. According to an analysis conducted by a U.S. journal specializing in aviation and space problems, the latest missile developed by the ROK government has an effective range of 60-100 miles and, if fired from the vicinity of the DMZ, would be capable of reaching Pyongyang.

At this point the ROK has an adequate means of delivering a nuclear weapon by missile. The ROK has indicated that it intends to acquire an indigenous source of nuclear fissionable materials, and appears to be at least 6 years ahead of North Korea in this respect.

The establishment of an enriched uranium plant is essential to the development of nuclear weapons, and, due to the expense, is not practicable for the ROK. For example, the total output of electricity in the ROK is about 7 million KW, while the three enriched uranium plants in the United States require some 52 million KW, a power demand equivalent to the entire amount of electricity used in Australia in a year. Judging from this, the primary obstacle confronting the establishment of an enriched uranium plant is in the economic sphere. There are also problems associated with a heavy water reactor using natural uranium. These are that there are likewise many difficulties from the standpoint of heavy water supply and reprocessing facilities.

The Question of Treaties

The stipulations of the NPT were designed to restrain nuclear nations from finishing non-nuclear nations with nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive materials, and, following along with this, are subject to comprehensive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition, in the spring of 1975 seven nuclear export nations, headed by the United States and including the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Canada and Japan, met in London and at the end of a series of secret meetings laid down guidelines for restricting the export of nuclear materials. Points agreed upon are as follows.

- 1) Nations obtaining nuclear technology from the above seven nations must adhere internationally to provisions laid down by the IAEA prohibiting nuclear proliferation.
- 2) Recipient nations must guarantee that nuclear materials will not be used in the fabrication of nuclear explosives, even for peaceful purposes.
- 3) Recipient nations must adopt safe measures to prevent theft or sabotage.
- 4) Recipient nations cannot export nuclear technology to third nations without security measures similar to the above.

The UK [sic] and France objected to this, suspecting that the United States wanted to monopolize world nuclear materials export markets.

Even with the assumption that the ROK could surmount such problems as these should it develop nuclear weapons, there is another obstacle to be overcome. There would still remain from the military standpoint the barrier of opposition and watchfulness on the part of the United States, which has responsibility for an important share of the ROK's security.

In March of 1978 the U.S. administration introduced in Congress, and had passed, a bill prohibiting nuclear proliferation. The bill was interpreted as providing proof to West Germany and France that U.S. opposition to nuclear proliferation was based on genuine concern for the future of mankind rather than on pressure for economic profit. The bill must also be viewed as applying strictly to nations being supplied with nuclear capabilities. Under this bill, the United States applies sanctions against the import by a non-nuclear nation of the technology for nuclear substance reprocessing, enrichment or heavy water production, even for peaceful purposes. These sanctions involve suspension of military and economic cooperation, of supply of nuclear materials and technology, and of exchange of information. Consequently, if a non-nuclear nation such as the ROK obtains the above types of technology or equipment from France or West Germany, it will of course be affected by such sanctions. Furthermore, there is no possibility of establishing nuclear reprocessing facilities secretly. Taiwan and Argentina established reprocessing facilities, but dismantled them in 1977 and 1976 under pressure from the United States. The ROK hopes to have energy independence by the year 2000 with the construction of 44 nuclear reactors, but should there be a decision to develop nuclear weapons, or actual development, the unprofitability stemming from heavy U.S. opposition would be hard to cope with.

When the time comes that the ROK develops nuclear weapons, what will happen is that the big powers, the United States in particular, will 1) suspend the supply of additional nuclear arms, 2) all U.S. technicians will be withdrawn, 3) all forms of economic aid will end, and 4) military assistance will be terminated.

In the case of the ROK, under present circumstances it may be conjectured that, on the basis of the U.S. commitment of military assistance under the Korea-U.S. Defense Treaty and intimate political, diplomatic and economic ties, such pressure tactics as the above would have their desired effect. The reason, as alluded to earlier, is that such a precedent exists. The ROK abandoned its plans for construction of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant under U.S. pressure. Of course, the efficacy of the aforementioned pressure is subject to change as the situation changes. Such changes in circumstances would include the development by the ROK of its own nuclear technology, economic development and reduction of dependence on the United States, or the total withdrawal of U.S. ground forces.

However one views current relations between the ROK and the United States, and whatever the costs involved, when the technical problems are solved we don't want the disadvantages arising from pressures, such as "punishment

measures," applied by nuclear nations like the United States do outweigh the advantages obtained from the development of nuclear arms. Kenneth Hunter, former deputy director of the British Strategic Issues Research Institute, has predicted that, "if the ROK were to have nuclear weapons, the United States would pack up everything immediately on that day and abandon Korea." Put another way, it can be said that the United States, either through some form of pressure or surveillance, would under no circumstances sit idly by until the ROK had nuclear weapons. The NPT cannot be viewed as a particularly large obstacle to the development of nuclear weapons by the ROK. This is due to the fact that a clause in the NPT allows a signatory to withdraw if 3 months advance notice is given.

Questions of Strategy

Supposing that the obstacles pointed out above, those involving technology, treaties and the rest, were overcome and the ROK had succeeded in the development of nuclear weapons, what results would be derived? One result would be, as noted earlier, that the prestige and stature of the ROK would be enhanced and national solidarity strengthened, and the nation would enjoy a war deterrent vis-a-vis the North Korean communists. Further, it is possible that having a nuclear capability could be used as a shield to protect against any reprehensible plots on the part of other nuclear nations to come to a general agreement on the Korean Question which is only to their benefit. In addition, by guaranteeing military superiority over North Korea and serving as a deterrent to war, it can be assumed that it would also increase the likelihood for coexistence between South and North Korea.

However, careful thought on the subject suggests that there are no guarantees that the situation would turn out exactly as described above, and that there are many related problems associated with the development of nuclear arms. First among these is the strategic/tactical problem. That is to say, it will be necessary to establish a strategic theory of nuclear war. With the availability of nuclear weapons, the first question is to decide what the targets are. It goes without saying that the primary targets are those areas where the North Korean communists are concentrated. Next will be the fixing of the location of potential targets. This is also a question of deciding whether or not to include the PRC and the Soviet Union.

There is no question that development of nuclear weapons by the ROK would influence nuclear development in Japan, that it would stimulate the development of nuclear arms by North Korea or that subsequently Taiwan would embark upon nuclear arms development, or that it would influence this phenomenon to become global in nature, a chain reaction of nuclear weapons development in areas such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, South America and Europe.

Disregarding areas other than Northeast Asia as being irrelevant for our purposes here, we shall take a look at what security in this area would be like with the appearance of the ROK, North Korea, Japan and Taiwan as nuclear nations. Professor Richard Rosencrance has done such an analysis.

First, as concerns relations between the super powers, stability decreases as the uncertainty associated with proliferation of nuclear weapons increases. Second, relations among all other nations become unstable because of the possibility of a preemptive strike. However, relations between the super powers and all other nations become more stable because of the balancing effect of nuclear weapons.

When this hypothesis is applied to South and North Korea, as usual a number of uncertainties remain. Specifically, if nuclear weapons are involved, it is indispensable to possess a capability to retaliate, but a great deal of expense is involved in having this retaliatory capability. It is a problem of developing a retaliatory capability in the face of difficulties such as small land area and concentrated population, extremely short period for advance warning of an enemy attack, dispersal of aircraft and the preparation of, and fortification of, underground airfield facilities, and so on. Furthermore, if the ROK develops a means for delivering a nuclear weapon, North Korea will also develop such a means, and if the ROK develops an antimissile missile, then North Korea will also have such development as a matter of course. There will have to be improvements in the advance warning capability in order to defend against a surprise attack from the other side, and to do this the collection of information as to the location of North Korean military facilities, industrial facilities and population concentrations will have to be developed independently and quickly. This stems from the fact that a single instance of incorrect intelligence analysis will make it impossible to escape from the disaster of nuclear war.

The Threat Associated with an Arms Race Between South and North Korea

Movement of military units, particularly movements in a surprise attack or a preemptive strike, must be detected before the event occurs, and in the event of failure there must be an adequate retaliatory capability. In order to pick up a North Korean communist surprise attack or preemptive strike beforehand and independently, it is necessary to either develop highly sensitive equipment or to have the reconnaissance capability of an unmanned satellite. The ROK would have to develop such a capability alone and maintain it alone. The new development and application of such equipment requires a tremendous expense and, if carried out, would initiate an additional arms race--a nuclear arms race--above and beyond a conventional race.

Assuming that the ROK had developed nuclear weapons and that the United States had completely withdrawn, there would be apprehension that North Korea, the PRC and the Soviet Union would launch a preemptive strike, and there would also be the possibility that they would attempt to destroy any potential to develop nuclear weapons through a semi-tactical strike. However, it is not thinkable that the influence of the United States would be pulled out of Northeast Asia, and in particular Korea, during the next 1-20 years, but rather that the United States will still be in Korea and that the United States, Soviet Union, PRC and Japan will maintain their four-power balance of power with the Korean peninsula at the center, just as is the case now,

and that China, the Soviets and the North Koreans would not attempt a preemptive strike or a semi-tactical attack. In addition, it would be extremely doubtful that the ROK would develop nuclear weapons as long as the United States maintains its influence in Korea.

The ROK could have nuclear arms ahead of North Korea, which would have a lapse of 5 to 6 years before it could possess nuclear weapons, and North Korea, being 5 to 6 years behind the ROK, would perceive the threat of nuclear attack during this period. Such being the case, the possibility would increase that the North Koreans would develop the rationale for a preemptive strike and provide unconventional warfare, and at the same time they would launch a peace offensive, pointing out the inhumanity and destructive power of nuclear weapons and proposing arms reductions and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. They would of course be secretly developing nuclear weapons on the one hand, and on the other criticizing ROK possession of nuclear weapons internationally to help offset their uneasiness resulting from the qualitative decline of their military power. Such a situation would be similar to relations between the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of the 1940's and beginning of the 1950's. At that time the United States had a 5 year jump on the Soviets in acquiring nuclear weapons, thus making them apprehensive. During the period in which the ROK had nuclear weapons and North Korea did not, the military balance between South and North Korea would be unstabilized. This period could be called the period of ROK nuclear monopoly.

Later, when the ROK and North Korea both had the same nuclear weapons, a military balance would be maintained. Such a period could be termed the "balance of nuclear terror" between South and North Korea. Nevertheless, even during this period, although not engaging in conventional warfare, North Korea would continue to engage in psychological warfare through the dispatch of armed infiltrators and through other types of unconventional warfare. Then South and North Korea would accelerate development of a nuclear delivery method and development of an anti-missile missile, and at the same time invest an enormous amount of economic resources into fortification of airfields and all types of facilities, as well as into the dispersion of aircraft. The cutthroat arms race based on nuclear strategic theory would be underway in full swing in South and North Korea. Under such circumstances, it is possible that there would be arms control proposals made between South and North Korea similar to the current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such an eventuality is a plausible hypothesis only in the absence of military conflict between South and North Korea.

The Strategic Value of Nuclear Weapons

The strategic value of nuclear weapons lies in their function as a deterrent to war, and in their use there is no objective. Conversely, the objective of convention weapons is their direct application in war, and they can be used. There has been no instance of even a single nuclear weapon being

used since World War II, and this is due to the terrible destruction that nuclear weapons can bring about. The nuclear bombs that were used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan at the end of World War I [sic] by the United States involved two bombs, one plutonium bomb and one uranium bomb, which were dropped as a test, one on each of the two cities. The massive killing power and destructiveness was demonstrated to all the world.

If the United States and the Soviet Union were to engage in nuclear war at present and reciprocate with nuclear weapons, it has been calculated that within a matter of a few days the victims would total more than 120 million people. This massive destruction of life would amount to the annihilation of more than half of the population of the United States. There would be such enormous loss of life despite the fact that the United States, Soviet Union and the PRC have extensive territory and can easily disperse their various military facilities and fortify them. In the case of the Korean peninsula, it was pointed out earlier that it is an area of concentrated population with everyone crowded in together. Here, the deterrent function of nuclear weapons has no credibility.

In his book "International Politics," Professor Hans Morgenthau wrote that, should nuclear war break out, 100 million people in the United States would die and nine-tenths of its economic power would be destroyed. He asks if those Americans left alive could take the remaining one-tenth of the economic base and reconstruct the economic power of the United States. He pointed out that, while nations armed with nuclear arms may be able to exercise control over another nation by saying I will destroy you if you don't follow my instructions, the situation may change if the nation so threatened says if you destroy me (with nuclear arms), then you too will be devastated. At this point the mutual threats offset each other. In other words, both nations will disregard a nuclear threat under the supposition that they are both rational actors. A threat to make use of nuclear arms which is capable of influencing the intentions of an opponent is a rational act, but their actual use would be irrational. This is due to the fact that if one country employs nuclear arms, then nuclear retaliation will come from the opponent.

The ROK, because of either its understanding of the great destructiveness of nuclear arms and the inhumanity and irrationality of their use, or because of the self-destruction that would result from the chain of retaliation, can enjoy the deterrent of conventional warfare, but it is extremely difficult to force its designs on the North Korean side or to aggressively obtain some political benefit. In order to obtain some concession or other act from the North Korean side, it is unavoidable that continued increases in conventional arms will be necessary.

There are those who claim that the ROK could reduce its expenditures for conventional arms if it possessed nuclear weapons, but it is apparent that such is not the case. The reason for this, as indicated below, has to do with the strategic aspects of being in possession of such arms. That is to say that, as a result of the excessive damage associated with the great

destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the loss of life involved in nuclear retaliation, the general feeling is that such would be an irrational strategy which could be used only by national leaders, and that the underlying feeling would be that nuclear weapons could not be used against North Korea--that is, ones brethren.

If the North Koreans perceive this, for the ROK to have nuclear weapons will result only in the outlay of huge sums of money, as well as some real doubts about the usefulness of nuclear weapons and their deterrent value in unconventional warfare, not to mention in conventional warfare. If such was the case, the emphasis of North Korea's strategy against the South would be switched to a form of people's warfare--the guerrilla war.

For example, the North Koreans would implement armed hostilities in which light infantry troops, highly trained in unconventional warfare, are inserted into the rear areas and cause social and political upheaval. Such guerrilla tactics would not be an all-out war which would give the United States the pretext to intervene, should U.S. troops remain in Korea following acquisition by the ROK of nuclear weapons, and are grounded on the position that the ROK not only could not threaten the use of nuclear weapons or actually use them, but that there would necessarily be opposition to a clash with conventional weapons also since expensive nuclear arms were available.

Consequently, we need to question whether or not the ROK would have much luck in deterring unconventional warfare, even if it had nuclear weapons, and if it should bear the double expense of both conventional arms and the arms required by nuclear strategic theory. It should be noted that the United States, even though it was in possession of nuclear weapons, could make absolutely no effective use of the threat to use them against the Vietnamese and Viet Cong employing guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. Such was also the case at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War.

North Korea's communist leader Kim Il-song has stated that, should war break out on the Korean peninsula, he does not think it possible that nuclear weapons would be used. In a 26 March 1976 interview for Japan's SEIKAI, he stated, "even if war broke out on the Korean peninsula, it would not be possible for nuclear arms to be employed. If our side and the enemy became entangled in a fight, how could such weapons be used on the peninsula? If the enemy were to use nuclear weapons, they themselves would be destroyed." Such was his opinion on nuclear weapons.

We can assume that if Kim does not believe that North and South Korea would use nuclear weapons against each other, even if they both had them, in the event war broke out, then he must be thinking that a new offensive against the South would involve either an all-out attack or a guerrilla-type insertion in the rear areas. In an all-out attack, the intention would be to destroy the retaliatory strength of the ROK and thus make the use of nuclear weapons impossible, and likewise, in the case of guerrilla-type rear area intrusion, to make it impossible to either threaten the use of

nuclear weapons or to actually use them. However, if both North and South possessed nuclear arms, the use of nuclear weapons could not be entirely ruled out. It is doubtful that war or any armed clash would be completely lacking between South and North Korea, but it is the case that there is always the possibility for an all-out attack or some other form of military conflict.

Given the possibility for war to break out between the South and the North, we can hypothesize the following scenarios. First, if the North Korean communists thought they were at an overwhelming military disadvantage to the ROK at some point in time and felt that an ROK attack was imminent, it would be possible that they would launch a preemptive attack. Second, it would be possible that they would launch a surprise attack if they believed they had overwhelming military superiority over the South and felt isolated by nuclear growth. Here the strategy would lie in thinking that the North Koreans could completely destroy the ROK's ability to retaliate, or, if not, to at least eliminate the ability to retaliate. Third, if North Korea felt that the South intended to launch a preemptive strike because it was either numerically inferior to the North or wanted to prevent a surprise attack, then the North could launch a preemptive strike first. Fourth, war could occur through miscalculation on the part of both sides.

If armed conflict was to occur as a result of one of the above incentives, and if one side reached the point where it was at a decided disadvantage during the course of conventional warfare and could not recover, there would be the potential for the tactical use of nuclear weapons in a limited nuclear war. Under such circumstances, there would be escalation toward limited nuclear war.

Once a limited nuclear war is under way, if one side again perceives a threat to its existence because it believes itself to be at a disadvantage during the course of the conflict, the result may be the use of strategic nuclear war. Harvard Professor Thomas C. Schilling opposes the execution of limited nuclear war, noting that such a war can easily escalate into a full-scale nuclear war. Professor Schilling states that, in human behavior, there is an escalation ladder, and that in this regard everyone has a threshold above which they are reluctant to climb. In a war based on conventional weapons, this threshold is represented by war based on tactical nuclear weapons. Once a limited nuclear war has been started, he says, it will then rapidly change into an all-out nuclear war.

In Henry Kissinger's "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," the essential point put forth is based on the premise that nuclear strategies should not assume that nuclear war will break out between the United States and the Soviet Union, but rather that confrontation between the United States and the Soviets will take place in a third area such as the Middle East, Asia or Africa. With South and North Korea in possession of nuclear capabilities, we would certainly not want to see the Korean peninsula plunged into nuclear war as an aftermath to tension between the United States and the Soviets or conflict

between the PRC and the Soviets. Assuming the outbreak of nuclear war between South and North Korea, it is predicted that damage would be extremely slight for attack targets in North Korea, since such targets are reinforced. In accordance with North Korea's four-point military line calling for the fortification of the entire country, major military and industrial facilities are underground, the result being that soft targets would absorb considerably less damage than in the South during a nuclear attack. There is no question that the continuation of tunneling operations in the DMZ by the North Korean communists, despite objections from the ROK, represent one aspect of fortification of the whole country in anticipation of future war.

Conclusion

Although in the foregoing we have analyzed a number of problems associated with a hypothesis based on South and North Korea becoming armed with nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons have never been put to use in a divided nation-type situation, nor have they been used on even a single occasion since the end of World War II. Just the thought of "using nuclear arms" against one's brethren is terrifying enough. Consequently, when both sides are in the process of developing nuclear weapons, and even after development has been completed and the weapons are actually in place, the ROK must always keep open the door for dialogue with North Korea and seek to come to a close understanding with the North Korean side, and must strive, through the channel of such mutual understanding, to avoid the tragedy of nuclear war. The problem of reunification can then be solved peacefully and in gradual stages, with the prerequisites for peace, and a general exchange between North and South, to be laid down prior to reunification.

On the other hand, the ROK must always be prepared for unconventional warfare, such as guerrilla tactics, from the North Korean side, even if nuclear weapons are developed. The upshot will be further increases in defense expenditures as both conventional and nuclear arms are maintained simultaneously, as required by nuclear strategy.

To strengthen national defense and security, the most important element is a firm determination on the part of all the people to defend their way of life. This is an indispensable requirement. No matter how much money is laid out for nuclear arms and conventional weapons, such weapons will be of absolutely no use if the nation's people do not have the will to fight.

To continually nurture the will and spirit to fight requires the continued development of political stability and economic prosperity, and in order for there to be political stability, the political foundation must be extended down to the very lowest level of society. National integration will be possible when this economic prosperity is equitably distributed to every individual.

The breadth of freedom must also be widened. It is an indisputable lesson of history that the tendency is for people to gain increased independence and rights as economic prosperity continues to increase. In constructing water-tight security, when the people have soaring spirits and a "stead-fast will to defend" themselves, this will play a more decisive role than a megaton nuclear weapon.

9062

CSO: 4108

S. KOREA/ECONOMY

BRIEFS

OVERSEAS BRANCHES OF FIRMS--Seoul, 4 Oct (HAPTONG)--The Bank of Korea (BOK) Wednesday ordered 270 overseas branches of Korean trading firms to close down immediately, it was belatedly learned here today. The 270 overseas branches were forced to close down as most of their home companies failed to apply for the extension of the validity period for them. Under the pertinent rules, the opening and operation of overseas branches by Korean trading firms are subject to prior approval of the Central Bank, and the validity period of BOK approval is one year. Of the 270 overseas branches instructed to close down, 136 were in North America, 52 in Asia, 28 in Europe, 25 in the Middle East, 13 in Latin America, 10 in Africa and six in Oceania, it was reported here. [Seoul HAPTONG in English 0836 GMT 4 Oct 79 SK]

CSO: 4120

S. KOREA/SOCIAL CONDITIONS

BRIEFS

SEOUL UNIVERSITY 'FORCED LEAVES'--Seoul, Sept. 27 (HAPTONG)--Campus activists and any other students found hampering the study atmosphere will henceforth be ordered off their class [as received] under a new regulation now in force at the state-run Seoul National University, it was belatedly reported today. Seoul National University revised a school regulation at a faculty meeting Monday under which the university president was empowered to order forced leaves for any student involved in unauthorized campus activities or with poor academic records. Those students in advanced stage of diseases will also be given compulsory leaves. The school authorities explained that the aim of new regulation was not merely to discipline students but to protect them from possible unhappy incidents. So far, the leave of absence from school has been allowed only when individual students requested it. [Text] [Seoul HAPTONG in English 0242 GMT 27 Sep 79 SK]

CSO: 4120

S. KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

BRIEFS

DELEGATION TO USSR--Tokyo Sept 21 KYODO--A four-member South Korean delegation including two government officials left Seoul Friday for Moscow by way of Tokyo to take part in an International Social Security Association meeting to be held in Tashkent in Soviet Central Asia from Monday, according to Radio Seoul monitored in Tokyo. The two officials are Lee Tu Ho, director of the Social Affairs Bureau, Health and Social Affairs Ministry, and Cha Hung Kyu, Social Affairs section chief of the same ministry, the broadcast said. They are the third group of South Korean Government officials ever granted entry visas by the Soviet Union. The two countries do not have diplomatic relations. [Tokyo KYODO in English no time given 21 Sep 79 OW]

ROK-INDONESIAN RESOURCES COUNCIL--Seoul, Sept. 28 (HAPTONG)--South Korea and Indonesia Thursday agreed to set up a joint resources consultative council in an effort to promote joint development and trade of resources, it was learned at the Energy-Resources Ministry today. An agreement on the establishment of the proposed council was reached in Jakarta between Yu Ho-min, director of the Resources Development Bureau of the Energy-Resources Ministry, and J. A. Katila. Director Yu is now in Jakarta at the head of a Korean delegation for talks with Indonesian Government officials, ministry sources said. Under the agreement signed by the two chief delegates Thursday, the new council will hold an annual meeting in Seoul and Jakarta alternately to discuss issues related to joint development of resources and exchanges of specialists and information on resources, the sources said. [Text] [Seoul HAPTONG in English 0232 GMT 28 Sep 79 SK]

CSO: 4120

N. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

KIM IL-SONG EXPRESSES HIS VIEWS TO NEPALESE JOURNALIST DELEGATION

Pyongyang KOREA TODAY in English Sep 79 pp 7-10

[Article: "Kim Il-song--Talk with a Nepalese Journalist Delegation, 19 Jun 79"]

[Text]

I should have met you in Pyongyang. But being away on a local tour of guidance, I was obliged to request you to come a long way here. I am very sorry for this. I would like you to understand this circumstance.

I bid you a hearty welcome on your visit to our country.

I express my thanks to you for your great efforts to promote friendship between the Korean and Nepalese peoples and for the active support and encouragement you have given our people.

I am especially grateful to you, the Chairman of the Nepalese Journalists Association, for your positive support and encouragement to the Korean people's struggle for national reunification and socialist construction, and also for the congratulatory messages you have sent me several times. Although this is my first meeting with you, I feel as if I am meeting an old friend. Today's meeting has made us close friends.

I present you my thanks for the cordial words you have spoken about this country and about myself. I am also thankful for

your active support to our people's cause of national reunification.

Today I meet you in the recess of a conference. Although our time is limited, I will briefly answer your questions.

You asked me to tell you about the fact that the Juche idea has now been widely propagated.

We can say that ours is an epoch of independence. Because many peoples who were once oppressed and exploited have been liberated from the yoke of imperialism and colonialism. And because the peoples who were under imperialist rule in the past are now aware that it is very important to uphold national independence and to maintain political independence, and are advancing along the road of independence.

The peoples who have entered upon the road of building a new society are now conscious, through the realities of life, that they should tackle everything including the building of the economy and culture in a way suited to the actual conditions of their own country. In building their countries now, the peoples do not follow an accepted formula or the examples of other nations, but are doing things after their own style to suit their own conditions. The peoples engaged in the building of a new society not only refuse to adopt the old capitalist way but, even in case of building socialism, will not follow in the footsteps of other countries.

Political idea, religion and social system differ from country to country, but every country considers that it must follow its own way, as required by its own people, to build a new society for the prosperity of its nation and for a happier life of its people.

In short, it is the main trend of the present times that the people of the world reject domination and subordination and aspire to national independence, sovereignty, self-support and self-reliance in national defence.

Now many countries hold that everything should serve the people, and that the people should be the master of society. Many people realize that only when free scope is given to the independence and creativeness of the popular masses can they fully accomplish the policy of independence in politics, self-support in the economy and self-reliance in national defence. Especially, they believe that only when an independent national economy is built can political independence be guaranteed.

I think that because they have such a belief, many people of the world come to cherish the same thought as ours.

Although I have a lot to speak about this problem, I will say no more, because you know well about it and, if you like, can hear more of it from the editor-in-chief of our *Rodong Sinmun*.

Now, I will answer your question about the prospects of our Second Seven-Year Plan.

Our Second Seven-Year Plan is a rather vast undertaking.

When this plan is fulfilled our country will rise to a higher eminence of socialism than now.

The cardinal target of this plan is the Juche-orientation, modernization and scientific development of the national economy.

Making the national economy Juche-oriented means building and developing the economy with domestic raw materials and techniques and in a way suited to the specific conditions of one's country.

Here I am now discussing the matter of making our metallurgical industry Juche-oriented with the personnel concerned.

Our country abounds in high-quality ores favourable for the development of this industry, but it is scarce of coking coal, its fuel. Therefore, we are discussing the possibility of expanding and developing this industry by using our anthracite as fuel while consuming less coking coal.

Scholars say it is fully possible to develop the metallurgical industry with our anthracite.

Not only the metallurgical industry but other national economic fields like chemical and light industries and agriculture are made to develop with our own raw materials and techniques, to suit the actual conditions in our country. This is the way Juche is applied in the national economy, and the matter is going successfully.

By the modernization of the national economy we mean replacing backward techniques with advanced ones.

Modernization does not always mean changing the backward techniques for the up-to-date at once just as jumping onto a five- or ten-storey building at a stretch. We think that even going up one storey higher is modernization.

Our modernization now is to advance the country's technology one step forward.

We are pushing forward modernization by introducing mechanization and automation in industry first to ease the people's hard work and obliterate the difference between heavy and light labour.

In brief, modernization is aimed at continuing the technical revolution. Freeing the people from hard labour through the technical revolution is a task advanced at our Party's Fifth Congress.

Our people are now successfully carrying on the technical revolution in all fields of the national economy under the banner of the three revolutions.

Scientification means elevating our science to a higher level. In other words, it means doing everything in a scientific way, including farm work. We will thus elevate our science to the world standard in the near future.

The Second Seven-Year Plan is now being carried on successfully and very smoothly.

We fulfilled the national economic plan for the first half of the year by June 10, that is, 20 days earlier, in total industrial output value.

At this rate, I think, the yearly plan will be fulfilled 20-30 days earlier.

Because all our working people are making devoted efforts in compliance with the policy of the Party and the Government, I believe that they will quite easily carry out the Second Seven-Year Plan before the set time.

We are confident we can fulfil the Second Seven-Year Plan.

We can say a lot more about this problem. If you wish, you can hear about it from the officials concerned. I think you have also formed your own views through your contact with our realities.

Next, I would like to dwell on the question of our country's reunification.

Our national reunification, the aspiration of the entire Korean people, is a matter of concern for you as well as for the rest of the people in the world.

It is quite natural that you who are friendly towards our country should be concerned about the question of Korea's reunification, and we are pleased about this.

You asked us what is standing in the way of reunification. I think the major obstacle to the reunification of our country is that the south Korean authorities do not want it. They try to make "two Koreas".

Our people are a homogeneous nation with the same language and customs. Our country has a 5,000-year-long history of culture. Our nation is homogeneous, and so it cannot be bisected. We are for reunification.

We maintain that the country should be reunified independently, peacefully, and on the principle of great national unity. Reunifying the country independently means achieving the aim by the efforts of the Korean people themselves, free from foreign interference. Further, the country should be reunified peacefully. We hold that the country be reunified with the present social system in south Korea and the socialist system in the northern half left intact. We consider that national unity should be achieved in the interests of the nation without regard to the difference in the social system, idea and religious belief, and that everything should be subordinated to the end of national reunification.

The south Korean authorities, however, are trying to keep Korea divided forever, with the backing of foreign forces. Hence, they are seeking to enter the United Nations as "two Koreas".

In spite of our advocacy of peaceful reunification, the south Korean authorities let the US troops stay in south Korea under the pretext of fictitious "threat of invasion from the north". And externally they insist on "cross recognition". Through cross recognition, that is, through US recognition of the north and Chinese and Soviet recognition of the south, they are trying in fact to turn Korea into two permanently divided countries.

The south Korean authorities are not only undesirous of reunification, but have gone so far as to build a "great wall" along the Military Demarcation Line. This is another vicious move for a permanent division of Korea.

But their attempt to divide Korea forever will never succeed. Since we are a homogeneous nation, the people in south Korea as well as in the north desire reunification.

Because the present south Korean authorities pursue a fascist repressive policy and keep suppressing the democratic movement, political parties and groups in south Korea have recently demanded that the discussion of the reunification question should not be made a monopoly of the authorities, but that many parties and groups should participate in it. We are of opinion that their demand is justified.

The major obstacle to the reunification of our country is that the south Korean authorities do not want reunification, and another obstacle is the backing the foreign forces are giving them. But we are quite capable of overcoming these obstacles. Although certain foreign powers are now obstructing the reunification of our country, we will surely reunify the country by the united efforts of the entire Korean people.

Lastly, I would like to refer to the relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Kingdom of Nepal.

You said that the friendly relations are developing favourably between Korea and Nepal, which I think is very important.

The Kingdom of Nepal and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea now have a great friendship. We deem this friendship fully in accord with the interests of our two peoples.

Our two countries, both located in Asia, champion independence. We are also member states of the non-aligned movement. I think this provides the basis of unity to our two countries.

We highly appraise and actively support the policy of the Kingdom of Nepal for developing into a peaceful, neutral and independent country.

Last year younger brothers of the King of Nepal visited our country, and it greatly contributed to the friendship between our two peoples.

In future, too, we will continue to strive for strengthening the friendship and solidarity between the Kingdom of Nepal and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, between the Nepalese and Korean peoples.

I hope that our two peoples will march forward shoulder to shoulder for the unity of the independent national states and the non-aligned countries.

Our two countries are developing nations, so we must cooperate and make interchanges and share good experiences with each other in all fields, further strengthening friendship and solidarity.

I believe that your efforts for cultivating friendship between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Kingdom of Nepal will further promote the friendly relations between our two countries.

I am very glad to see you today. I hope you will continue to work for the friendship between the two countries as good friends of the Korean people.

I am very grateful that you have come here to see me today, and hope that back home you will kindly convey to your people the best wishes of our people for them.

N. KOREA/ECONOMY

DIRECTOR DESCRIBES OJIDON IRRIGATION SYSTEM NEAR PYONGYANG

Pyongyang KOREA TODAY in English Aug 79 pp 57-59

[Article by: Kim Kyong-nyol [ryol], director of the Hwangju Irrigation Control Station: "Kindung Plain Overflows with Life-giving Water"]

[Excerpts] There lies a vast plain southwest of the Chunghwa County, an outlying district of Pyongyang. It is the hilly Kindung Plain, which is also called the Hwangju Plain.

The Hwangjuchon and other rivers frequently swelled with the rain, flooding villages and fields. Irrigation of fields, therefore, was the age-old desire of the people there and flood and drought were the cause of all sorts of sufferings and misfortunes for them.

In a short time after the war the irrigation work was successfully carried out to wet the plain through the Ojidon Irrigation System.

Irrigation channels are ramified all over the plain through long tunnels, culverts and four or five-stage pumping stations.

Over 40 drainage stations were established to completely protect fields and crops from stagnant water.

During the Six-Year Plan period the big Yontan reservoir was completed in the upper Hwangjuchon River, which feeds and is fed by the Ojidon Irrigation System.

In the same period, sprinkler irrigation has been introduced in all dry fields and the plain became fully irrigated.

The cold front sweeping the world hits our country, quite often causing severe drought and unseasonable flood exceeding common knowledge and imagination.

In recent years, in the sowing, rice-transplanting and crop-growing seasons rain did not come throughout the country including the plan for 70 to 90 days.

But our agricultural production increased every year thanks to the best irrigation system established by the great leader.

In 1977 the Yongchon Cooperative Farm in the plain produced over 1,500 tons more of grain than in the previous year.

Last year its per-hectare maize output grew 500 kg.

It is important for increased agricultural production to well control and effectively use water.

The fatherly leader set up the county irrigation control station in each county, a special institution to manage and operate many irrigation works, the precious property of the country, and exercise a coordinated control over water supply.

Many pumping stations equipped with modern medium and small machines, numerous tunnels, hundreds of culverts, blind ditches and aqueducts and other structures under the Hwangju irrigation control station serve to irrigate the plain. The irrigation works in the plain use nearly as much electricity as a big iron works does.

The state makes large investment every year and sends our station various machines and equipment and a huge amount of steel and cement to well repair and protect, reinforce and operate our irrigation works.

Our station established a comprehensive control system and supplies water in the transplanting, sowing and other seasons in a planned and coordinated way.

With a high sense of responsibility as the master of the country the workers and technicians of our station supply and control water scientifically and strive to reduce the consumption of water per hectare of fields. They dug water-pockets at different places and collected every drop of water and help to effectively use water. Many hundred million cubic metres of water is now kept in store in the big Yontan reservoir and Lake Sohung.

Thousands of wells and ponds were dug and water-jetting pipes driven according to the Party's policy of making a revolution to obtain ground water.

We keep in store water enough to feed the plain for three years.

A perfect and stable irrigation system has been established and mechanization and chemicalization are nearing completion. As a result, the Kindung Plain, forsaken as a barren land for thousands of years, has now turned into a famous grain and fruit producer.

CSO: 4120

N. KOREA/ECONOMY

PRODUCTION CAPACITY OF PYONGYANG COAL MINING MACHINE FACTORY INCREASES

Pyongyang KOREA TODAY in English Aug 79 pp 26-27

[Excerpts] The Pyongyang Coal Mining Machine Factory is one of the big mining machine factories in our country.

The factory started production in the postwar rehabilitation and construction period. At the beginning it was a small factory making small coal cars and accessories of machines.

As the national economy strengthened, its production and technical equipments steadily improved and increased.

It is in serial production of hydraulic props, chain conveyor, anthracite selectors, drilling machines and other mining machines and over 120 kinds of parts and accessories of coal mining machines.

Its products are greatly contributing to making mining machines and equipment large-sized, modernized and high-speed. Hydraulic prop is its chief product.

Workers at the factory fulfilled their Six-Year Plan assignments a year and half ahead of schedule. In 1978 they increased the production of hydraulic props and mining machines and equipment 1.5 times and that of accessories nearly 2 times as against 1976.

The great leader paid deep attention to turning the factory into a modern mining machine plant.

With a high sense of responsibility as master of the revolution, workers and technicians of the factory, together with three-revolution team members, made by themselves more than 50 kinds of machines and equipment including a 1,000-ton press, side milling cutters, a 750-ton air hammer and increased the production capacity of their factory.

From the beginning of this year they are overfulfilling their plan assignments, 1.3 times higher than last year's, every month and carried out their first half-year plan assignments by April 15.

N. KOREA/ECONOMY

'HAPTONG' DPRK INCREASED PURCHASE OF JAPANESE MOTOR VEHICLES

Seoul HAPTONG in English 0810 GMT 29 Sep 79 SK

[Text] Tokyo, 29 Sep (HAPTONG)--North Korea imported 1,357 units of various motor vehicles and auto parts from Japan during the first nine months of this year.

The nine-month figure includes 220 units of motor vehicles contracted between North Korea and Japanese suppliers this month.

The nine-month figure also reflected a whopping rise over the 818 units imported by North Korea in 1977 and the 774 units last year.

According to informed sources at the Japanese customs office, North Korea bought from Japan 460 units of six- to eight-ton cargo trucks and buses, 164 units of passenger cars and 269 units of sashes for cargo trucks in the first seven months of this year.

The Japanese-made sashes for trucks were imported by North Korea mostly for the assembly of military vehicles, it was reported here.

To help settle its payments for vehicle imports from Japan, North Korea exported some 400 to 500 million yen worth of gold and silver to Japan in July and August this year through a Nagoya-based Korean firm operated by the pro-Pyongyang Organization of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongnyon), it was also learned here.

CSO: 4120

BRIEFS

NAMPO CONVEYOR--Pyongyang, 7 Sep--A large scale modernly equipped belt conveyor was built at Nampo Port, a trade port of our country. The loading of paper-packed freight is comprehensively mechanized on the conveyor equipped with an industrial T.V. set. The builders completed the conveyor in a brief period, far ahead of schedule. A meeting for conveying the thanks of the respected and beloved leader and putting the conveyor into commissioning was held on the spot on 6 September. One more belt conveyor will be built at the port within this year. [Pyongyang KCNA in English 1500 GMT 7 Sep 79 SK]

COAL MINING GAINS--Kujang District Coal Mining Industry complex is continuously increasing coal production every day by 110 to 115 percent. Officials of the complex go down to the pits and conduct political and economic propaganda among the miners and stir up revolutionary spirits by presenting solutions to the problems at proper time. In (Yongdong) colliery, the working people are producing more than 20 percent above the planned quota by making innovations in technical management of the transportation equipment. In (Yongnung) colliery, working people are increasing coal production by 125 percent by good organizational of production work. Yongsu colliery is increasing coal production by more than 120 percent by introducing appropriate blasting methods. [Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2300 GMT 5 Sep 79 SK]

WHEAT AND BARLEY HARVEST--This autumn Yanggang Province expects another bumper crop. The state-run farms and cooperative farms, including (Taehongdan) prefecture general farm and Potae general farm, now harvest on 600 to 700 Chongbo by introducing a blitzkrieg and annihilation battle with a concentrated mobilization of all mechanization means. Provincial party members and working people in the three-revolution teams in Kapsan, Sinpa, Pungsan and Paekam prefectures, who have started harvesting earlier than anybody else, are overfulfilling the daily quota by more than 200 to 250 percent. Party members and working people in Pochon, Samsu, (Unhung) and Pungsu are gaining high achievements under the plan to finish the harvest of wheat and barley before 10 September in the low-lying lands and by 15 September in the high lands. [Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2300 GMT 5 Sep 79 SK]

TELEVISION RECEIVER PLANT--A large modern television receiver plant--Taedonggang television receiver plant--has been newly erected in Pyongyang, the city of revolution. It has about 10 workshops, including an assembly workshop, a processing workshop, a casing workshop and a power workshop with a conveyor system. Also it has 15 laboratories, including a color TV research laboratory and an electronic installation laboratory and its own television broadcasting station to check the reception of the finished receivers. It has already started production and distribution of its two brands: (Pyongyang-ho) and (Taedonggang-ho). [Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 0300 GMT 12 Sep 79 SK]

CSO: 4108

N. KOREA/BIOGRAPHICS

BRIEFS

NEW CHIEF OF STAFF--Tokyo Sept 22 KYODO--Pyongyang Radio revealed Saturday that O Kuk-yol, a member of the North Korean Communist Party's Central Committee, has assumed the post of chief of general staff of the North Korean People's Army. In a broadcast monitored here, it reported O Kuk-yol had a meeting with a military delegation from Rwanda in the capacity of chief of general staff. The top military post had been known to belong to O Chin-u who concurrently was defense minister. [Tokyo KYODO in English 22 Sep 79 OW]

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